Rebel rule: a governmentality perspective by Hoffman, Kasper & Verweijen, Judith
African Affairs, 1–23 doi: 10.1093/afraf/ady039
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights
reserved
REBEL RULE: A GOVERNMENTALITY
PERSPECTIVE
KASPER HOFFMANN AND JUDITH VERWEIJEN*
ABSTRACT
Much of the recent literature on rebel governance and violent political
orders works with ‘centred’ and instrumental understandings of power.
In this view, power is seen as exercised over subjects, and as situated in
rebel rulers, governance institutions, or ruling networks. Drawing on the
study of the armed groups known as ‘Mai-Mai’ in eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, this article instead adopts a governmentality per-
spective on rebel governance. It demonstrates how Mai-Mai groups rule
not only through direct imposition but also, more subtly, by shaping peo-
ple’s subjectivities and self-conduct. We identify four clusters of techni-
ques of Mai-Mai rule that relate respectively to ethnicity and custom;
spirituality; ‘stateness’; and patronage and protection. We argue that a
governmentality perspective, with its focus on rationalities and practices
of power, offers a fine-grained understanding of rebel rule that moves
beyond common binaries such as coercion versus freedom. By showing
its relevance for the analysis of rebel rule in the eastern Congo, our find-
ings further strengthen the case for applying a governmentality perspec-
tive to non-Western political orders.
THE EASTERN PART OF THE Democratic Republic of the Congo is a verit-
able rebel kaleidoscope. Well over 120 armed groups operate in the area,
in ever-changing alliances and locations.1 The majority of these groups
identify themselves as ‘Mai-Mai’, a generic label for armed groups
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drawing on discourses of (community) self-defence and autochthony.
While they differ substantially in size and mode of organization, most
Mai-Mai groups are relatively small, numbering less than 200 fighters.
Furthermore, the majority of these groups have only partial and shifting
control over territory and lack elaborate organizational structures, such
as courts and administrations, for governing populations. These charac-
teristics raise the question: do Mai-Mai groups actually govern civilians,
and if so, how?
Recent literature on rebel governance and wartime political orders
considers power to be ‘centred’ either in rebel rulers, their governance
institutions, or the ruling networks of which they are part.2 These rulers
and institutions are seen to exercise ‘power over’ subjects, implying the
imposition of their will on others in an instrumental manner.3 In this
contribution, we challenge these perspectives on power and governance.
Drawing on Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’, we show
that Mai-Mai groups rule through a heterogeneous cluster of techniques
of power. These include techniques relying on direct imposition and
coercion, but to a large extent consist of techniques that work more
indirectly, by shaping people’s self-conduct. Such techniques are not
invented from scratch but instead build upon and alter existing regimes
of truth and micro-practices of power. We identify four salient clusters
of techniques of Mai-Mai rule. These relate to: ethnicity and custom;
spirituality; ‘stateness’; and patronage and protection. This approach to
rebel rule is innovatory in that it takes techniques and rationalities of
power, instead of rulers or governance institutions, as the analytical
point of departure. From a governmentality perspective, power is neither
institutional nor instrumental: ‘it does not act directly and immediately
on others’.4 Rather, it stretches subtly into the very constitution of sub-
jects via their bodily routines and sense of selfhood. To govern, in this
sense, ‘is to structure the possible field of action of others’.5 This view of
power and rule helps transcend forms of binary thinking (such as state
versus non-state, coercion versus freedom) that hamper more fine-
grained conceptualizations of rebel rule.
Our analysis draws on 22 months of fieldwork for different research
projects conducted periodically between 2005 and 2017 in the city of
Bukavu and the areas of Fizi, Uvira, Itombwe, and Kalehe in South
2. For a discussion of ‘centred’ power (a term coined by Latour), see John Allen, Lost geog-
raphies of power (Blackwell, Oxford, 2003), pp. 25–28.
3. Ibid, p. 21. Allen relates the instrumental view of power to the conflation of power with
domination, see Lost geographies, pp. 21, 25–27.
4. Michel Foucault, ‘The subject and power’, Critical Inquiry 8, 4 (1982), pp. 777–795, p. 789.
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Kivu province. These projects aimed to study the constitution and work-
ings of local socio-political orders, including the role of Mai-Mai
groups.6 While the authors conducted field research separately, they
used largely similar methods and criteria to select informants. Data were
gathered through ethnographic methods, in particular individual and
group interviews, informal conversations and observations. Interviewing
was complemented by the study of written documents, including educa-
tional material, political statements, and other political communications
from Mai-Mai groups as well as their administrative documents (e.g. tax
receipts, accountancy documents, and situation reports). Informants
were selected based on their knowledge of Mai-Mai groups, the fact that
they were or had been part of those groups, or lived currently or previ-
ously in zones with pervasive Mai-Mai influence. In remote field sites,
the availability of informants also played a role, in addition to Mai-Mai
groups’ own choice of whom they allowed us to talk to. Informants
encompassed current and former military Mai-Mai members (98 officers
and non-commissioned officers, 58 rank-and-file), Mai-Mai political
representatives and civilian administrators (33), and spiritual/religious
specialists connected to Mai-Mai groups (8). We also contacted custom-
ary and administrative authorities (130), members of state security ser-
vices (55), and different professional groups (at least 400 farmers,
fishermen, artisanal miners, motor-taxi drivers, small-scale traders,
cattle-herders, health sector workers, and hotel/bar/restaurant owners
and managers). Fieldwork was conducted in over 90 villages and towns
and in the headquarters or positions of seven Mai-Mai groups (Kapopo,
Mushombe, Baleke, Yakotumba, Fujo, Mulumba, ex-Padiri), where
sometimes several days were spent. The data gathered during the field
research were triangulated with relevant academic literature, news arti-
cles, and reports of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
United Nations (UN) agencies.
The article is structured as follows. We first present our case for apply-
ing a governmentality perspective to rebel governance. The next section
places today’s Mai-Mai groups in historical and social context and dis-
cusses their main features. This paves the way for an in-depth analysis of
the four clusters of techniques that constitute Mai-Mai rule. We end by
reflecting on the implications of our findings for the study of rebel rule
and governmentality in non-Western political orders.
6. The Mai-Mai groups studied are those of Aoci, Baleke, Fujo, Kapopo, Mushombe,
Mulumba, Yakotumba, Bede Rusagara, Nyerere, Simusizi, Karakara, Bwasakala, Mayele,
Assani Ngungu, and Padiri.
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Cutting off the warlord’s head in the study of rebel rule
In recent years, ‘rebel governance’ has emerged as an interdisciplinary
subfield of study. It is generally defined in broad terms, for instance as
‘the organization of civilians within rebel-held territory for a public
purpose’.7 Despite this broad approach, much of the scholarship oper-
ates with a specific understanding of governance.8 It holds that to actu-
ally govern civilians, rebels must control territory and create structures
and rules through which they can govern and provide public goods.9
This understanding transposes to rebel governance two key tenets of
the classic Weberian model of the state: first, that power is exercised
through a set of centrally directed political institutions; second, that
these institutions are contained within a bounded territory.10 As a cor-
ollary, the effectiveness of rebel governance is often assessed in terms
of rebels’ levels of territorial control, institutional development, and
public goods provision.11 The sovereign territorial state is thus taken as
a universal form of political organization against which rebel govern-
ance is measured.
The rebel governance literature differs from other scholarship on war-
time socio-political orders, which emphasizes networks rather than terri-
torialized institutions. For instance, Mark Duffield highlights the
centrality in contemporary warfare of multi-scalar political-economic net-
works that blur conventional boundaries, like the public/private and state/
non-state divides.12 Similarly, the ‘governance without government’ litera-
ture emphasizes how transboundary networks of state and non-state actors
govern through complex negotiations and accommodations,13 leading to
what Janet Roitman has described as ‘the pluralization of regulatory
7. Nelson Kasfir, ‘Rebel governance, constructing a field of enquiry: Definitions, scope,
patterns, order, causes’, in Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly (eds), Rebel
governance in civil war (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015), pp. 21–46, p. 24.
8. Not all rebel governance literature considers territorial control a prerequisite for rebel
governance. See, for instance, Reyko Huang, The wartime origins of democratization: Civil war,
rebel governance, and political regimes (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016), p. 52.
9. Kasfir, ‘Rebel governance’, p. 27; Jeremy Weinstein, Inside rebellion: The politics of insur-
gent violence (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), p. 164.
10. John Agnew, ‘The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international rela-
tions theory’, Review of International Political Economy 1, 1 (1994), pp. 53–80; Allen, Lost
geographies, pp. 33–34.
11. Ana Arjona, ‘Wartime institutions: A research agenda’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 58,
8 (2014), pp. 1360–1389, pp. 1375–1377 and Zachariah Mampilly, Rebel rulers: Insurgent gov-
ernance and civilian life during war (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and London, 2012),
p. 1.
12. Mark Duffield, ‘War as a network enterprise: The new security terrain and its implica-
tions’, Cultural Values 6, 1–2, (2002), pp. 153–165.
13. Timothy Raeymaekers, Ken Menkhaus, and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘State and non-state
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authority’.14 William Reno, in turn, foregrounds patronage networks
centred around ‘warlords’, who may be either state rulers or rebels.15
These analyses highlight networked and negotiated forms of authority
rather than political institutions exercising power over a finite territory.
Nevertheless, they also tend to operate with a centred understanding of
power insofar as they conceptualize power as concentrated either in polit-
ical authorities like warlords themselves, or in the wider politico-military
and social networks and institutions of which they form part. In addition,
by focusing on how authority relates to control over people and resources,
these approaches generally reflect an instrumental view of power. Similar
conceptualizations of power can be discerned in the recent literature on
rebel legitimacy. While also studying societal norms, values, and beliefs,
in addition to rulers and governance structures, this literature primarily
examines how these elements legitimize rebel rulers’ domination, hence
their power over civilians.16 Thus, they locate power predominantly in
rebel rulers and their administrations, while taking the ruler/ruled axis as
analytical point of departure.17 These conceptualizations of power do not
adequately capture how Mai-Mai groups govern people in the eastern
Congo. Paraphrasing Foucault’s critique of conventional views on power
and the state, we suggest we need to ‘cut off the warlord’s head’ in the
study of rebel governance.18 In other words, to deepen our understanding
of how armed groups govern civilians, we need to look beyond political
actors, institutions, and networks. The concept of governmentality offers
such an alternative perspective.
Through the term governmentality, Foucault proposed a radical cri-
tique of centred and instrumental understandings of power. Foucault
employs the term governmentality both in a broad sense as an analytic of
power relations in general and in a narrow sense as a mode of rule labelled
‘government’ which emerged in Europe in the early modern era.19 This
mode of rule subsequently gained pre-eminence over forms of power that
14. Janet Roitman, Fiscal disobedience: An anthropology of economic regulation in Central
Africa (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2005), p. 18.
15. William Reno, Warlord politics and African states (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1999),
pp. 1–3.
16. For example, Till Förster, ‘Dialogue direct: Rebel governance and civil order in northern
Côte d’Ivoire’, in Arjona et al., Rebel governance, pp. 203–225, pp. 203–204; Klaus Schlichte
and Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Armed groups and the politics of legitimacy’, Civil Wars 17, 4
(2015), pp. 409–424; p. 410; Mampilly, Rebel rulers, p. 8.
17. As Isabelle Duyvesteyn writes, legitimacy ‘is a relational concept, which relies on an
interactive relationship between a social/political actor and his/her supposed constituents’,
Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ‘Rebels and legitimacy: An introduction’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 28,
4–5 (2017), pp. 669–685, p. 674.
18. Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality, Vol. I: An introduction, trans. Robert Hurley
(Pantheon Books, New York, NY, 1978 [1976]), pp. 88–89.
19. Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society (Sage, Los Angeles,
CA, 2010), pp. 24–30.
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prevailed in previous periods, in particular ‘sovereign’ and ‘disciplinary’
power, although it did not replace them. While ‘sovereign’ power denotes
the sovereign’s rule over subjects through law, ‘disciplinary’ power is exer-
cised over and through the individual, the body, and its forces and capaci-
ties.20 Government, by contrast, implies attending to ‘each and all’ or
caring for and regulating every individual and the health and prosperity of
the population as a whole.21 Such regulation also extends to sociobio-
logical processes, or what Foucault calls ‘biopolitics’.22 Government
occurs to a large degree through ‘making up’23 certain kinds of subjects
who are capable of governing themselves, in particular by engaging with
‘regimes of truth’24 that produce certain ways of seeing, knowing, and
conducting the self, or ‘techniques of the self’.25 Hence government
largely takes place through a kind of ‘regulated freedom’, rather than
through direct imposition, as people turn themselves into subjects of
power.26 From a governmentality perspective, then, power is not concen-
trated in institutions or ruling authorities that govern subjects. Rather, it
is ‘capillary’ and dispersed throughout the social body.27
Governmentality’s European roots have led to criticism concerning its
applicability to non-Western contexts. Some have argued that the
emphasis on power through ‘regulated freedom’ is inappropriate outside
of Western liberal democracies, on the ground that such freedom often
does not exist there.28 Like other scholars, however, we contend that the
concept can be employed fruitfully in non-European contexts, since the
related rationalities and techniques of power have spread around the
globe.29 One of the main vectors of this spread was European
20. Michel Foucault, Security, territory, population: Lectures at the Collège de France,
1977–1978, trans. Graham Burchell (Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2007 [2004]), pp.
140–142.
21. Foucault, Security, territory, population, p. 173.
22. Michel Foucault, Society must be defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976,
trans. David Macey (New York, NY, Picador, 2003 [1997]), p. 243.
23. Ian Hacking, ‘Making up people’, in Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E.
Wellbery (eds), Reconstructing individualism (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1986),
pp. 222–236, p. 234.
24. Michel Foucault, ‘The political function of the intellectual’, Radical Philosophy 17, 13
(1977), pp. 12–14, p. 13.
25. Michel Foucault, The use of pleasure. The history of sexuality, Vol. 2, trans. Robert
Hurley (Vintage Books, New York, NY, 1990 [1984]), p. 11.
26. Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, ‘Political power beyond the state: Problematics of gov-
ernment’, The British Journal of Sociology 43, 2 (1992), pp. 173–205, p. 174.
27. Michel Foucault, ‘Prison talk’, in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/knowledge: Selected inter-
views and other writings 1972–1977 (Pantheon Books, New York, NY, 1980), pp. 37–54, 39.
28. Jonathan Joseph, ‘The limits of governmentality: Social theory and the international’,
European Journal of International Relations 16, 2 (2010), pp. 223–246; see also Jan Selby,
‘Engaging Foucault: Discourse, liberal governance and the limits of Foucauldian IR’,
International Relations 21, 3 (2007), pp. 324–345, pp. 331–333.
29. Rita Abrahamsen, ‘African studies and the postcolonial challenge’, African Affairs 102,
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colonization. Colonial rule was founded on racial inequality, violence, and
disciplinary techniques of power. However, it also operated through bio-
political rationalities and techniques of government, such as statistics, sur-
veys, ethnology and cartography, and through the formation of new
subjectivities among colonized populations.30 The latter were fostered by
institutions such as the plantation, the chieftaincy, the mission station,
and the hospital, which brought new techniques of the self. These techni-
ques revolved around making the colonized cognizant of the moral work
they had to carry out on themselves to become ‘civilized’, ‘modern’, ‘eth-
nic’, and ‘Christian’ subjects.31 However, for Ann Laura Stoler and
Frederick Cooper, colonial states were ‘neither monolithic nor omnipo-
tent’.32 Consequently, the governmentalization of colonial spaces was not
a matter of unilateral action by the colonial state. Rather, in a process that
Ian Hacking calls ‘looping effects’,33 rationalities and techniques of gov-
ernment were diffusely dispersed throughout the colonial world, as colo-
nial subjects in Africa and elsewhere appropriated, reinterpreted, resisted,
and instrumentalized them.34
Many of the subjectivities and techniques of government that developed
during the colonial era have remained salient after independence. At the
same time, a plethora of new regimes of truth and practices of government
have emerged, part of which revolve around notions developed in
Western contexts like modernity, development, democracy,35 or the envir-
onment.36 However, as in the colonial era, these postcolonial forms of
governmentality have not simply been ‘imposed’ by ‘the West’. Rather,
they are filtered through existing regimes of truth and mixed with existing
techniques of power, while being conditioned by power relations and
struggles. Thus, while we use governmentality here in the narrow sense of
African politics and Foucauldian theory’, Review of International Studies 39, 3 (2013), pp.
763–787.
30. For a review of the literature on colonial governmentality, see: Stephen Legg,
‘Governmentality, congestion, and calculation in colonial Dehli’, Social and Cultural
Geography 7, 5 (2006), pp. 709–729; pp. 709–716.
31. Jean-François Bayart, ‘Africa in the world: A history of extraversion’, African Affairs 99,
395 (2000), pp. 217–267; pp. 246–250; Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Of revelation and
revolution, Volume I: Christianity, colonialism, and consciousness in South Africa (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1991), pp. 4–5.
32. Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, ‘Between metropole and colony: Rethinking
a research agenda’, in Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds), Tensions of empire:
Colonial cultures in a bourgeois world (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los
Angeles, CA, 1997), pp. 1–58, p. 6.
33. Ian Hacking, ‘The looping effects of human kinds’, in Dan Sperber, David Premack,
and Ann James Premack, Causal cognition: A multi-disciplinary approach (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1995), pp. 351–394.
34. Comaroff and Comaroff, Of revelation and revolution, pp. 17–18.
35. Roitman, Fiscal disobedience, pp. 32–33; Jean-François Bayart, l’État en Afrique: La poli-
tique du ventre (2nd edition) (Fayard, Paris, 2006 [1989]), p. 88.
36. Carl Death, The green state in Africa (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2016),
pp. 2, 10–11.
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a distinct mode of rule that attends to ‘each and all’ and largely operates
through ‘regulated freedom’, we recognize that the shapes assumed by
governmentality are historical and contextual.37 Therefore, within African
political orders, they will necessarily differ from the forms that developed
in European contexts.
These observations emerge from our study of Mai-Mai groups in the
eastern Congo, which showed that these groups both draw upon and
reconfigure sedimented subjectivities and engrained rationalities and tech-
niques of government. Indeed, what we call the ‘symbolic efficacy’38 of
the Mai-Mai’s techniques of rule to a large extent resides in their repro-
duction of existing ontologies, discourses, and rationalities and techniques
of power, including those pertaining to governmentality.39 However, Mai-
Mai groups also creatively recombine and reconfigure these elements, or
extend them to new domains. Furthermore, as is characteristic of govern-
mentality, the Mai-Mai’s techniques of government combine with more
‘disciplinary’ and ‘sovereign’ forms of power.40 Thus, Mai-Mai rule is
double-edged: on the one hand, it operates through civilians’ techniques
of the self; on the other hand, it works through more coercive and direct
ways of rule, including the use of violence.
Situating Mai-Mai groups
‘Mai-Mai’ is a catch-all label for a heterogeneous set of armed groups that
first mobilized in North Kivu towards the end of the 1980s. The First
(1996–7) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars accelerated the prolifer-
ation of such groups throughout the eastern Congo. These groups grad-
ually began to call themselves ‘Mai-Mai’, a name derived from the Swahili
word for water (mai or mayi). The term refers to a purification ritual in
which fighters are sprinkled with specially prepared water to obtain pro-
tection on the battlefield.41
In 2003, the belligerents of the Second Congo War adopted a peace
accord based on political and military power sharing. State functions were
37. Cf. Stuart Elden, ‘Governmentality, calculation, territory’, Environment and Planning
D: Society and Space 25, 3 (2007), pp. 562–580, p. 567.
38. Claude Lévi-Strauss, ‘L’Efficacité symbolique’, Revue de l’histoire des religions 135, 1
(1949), pp. 5–27.
39. Our understanding of symbolic efficacy is inspired by Lévi-Strauss’s use of the term to
explain the effectiveness of shamans’ healing techniques. The latter rests not only on beliefs
in the effectiveness of the shaman’s power, but also on the collective beliefs and expectations
of the social group of which shaman and patient are part, which acts as the wider gravita-
tional field within which their relationship is located and defined. Lévi-Strauss, ‘L’Efficacité
symbolique’, pp. 18–20.
40. Foucault, Security, territory, population, pp. 142–143.
41. Koen Vlassenroot and Frank Van Acker, ‘War as exit from exclusion? The formation









niversity user on 26 Septem
ber 2018
partitioned between the signatories, who committed to integrating their
armed wings into the newly formed national army, the Forces armées de la
République démocratique du Congo (FARDC, Armed Forces of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo). Power sharing, however, worked to
the disadvantage of most Mai-Mai fighters. Lacking higher-level political
connections and clout, their chances of obtaining positions of importance
were limited. Combined with ongoing insecurity and communal tensions,
this prompted many Mai-Mai to refuse army integration or else withdraw
from the process.42 As a result, a wave of new Mai-Mai groups appeared
between 2007 and 2009. Since then, their numbers have continued to
grow, as existing groups splintered and new ones emerged.
While diverse, these post-settlement groups share certain traits. First,
they draw on discourses of autochthony, which are structured around a
dichotomy between ‘natives’ (the ‘original’ or ‘first’ inhabitants of an
area) and ‘foreigners’.43 Second, current Mai-Mai groups tend to be
rooted in particular imagined ‘ethnic’ communities that they claim to
defend.44 Third, most Mai-Mai groups employ spiritual techniques, draw-
ing on a set of dynamic and syncretic beliefs. Some of these are derived
from Judeo-Christian beliefs introduced through colonialism, while others
have their origin in beliefs predating colonial penetration.45 Fourth, many
Mai-Mai groups express a profound discontent with the current socio-
political order, in particular the incumbent government. They accuse the
latter of siding with ‘foreigners’, and of being illegitimate and corrupt.46
Most Mai-Mai groups are part of wider social networks that are estab-
lished through a variety of overlapping ties, such as those based on ethni-
city, patronage, family affiliation, and shared political beliefs. These
networks provide crucial access to resources and services. Their members
facilitate the Mai-Mai’s revenue-generation activities, help procure basic
42. Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, ‘The volatility of a half-cooked bouilla-
baisse: Rebel–military integration and conflict dynamics in eastern DRC’, African Affairs
112, 449 (2013), pp. 563–582, p. 566.
43. Judith Verweijen, ‘From autochthony to violence? Discursive and coercive social prac-
tices of the Mai-Mai in Fizi, eastern DR Congo’, African Studies Review 58, 2 (2015), pp.
157–180; Kasper Hoffmann and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Armed groups and the exercise of pub-
lic authority: The cases of the Mayi Mayi and Rayia Mutomboki in Kalehe, South Kivu’,
Peacebuilding 2, 2 (2014), pp. 202–220.
44. Judith Verweijen and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Armed mobilisation and the nexus of terri-
tory, identity, and authority: The Banyamulenge’s contested territorial aspirations in eastern
DR Congo’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 33, 2, (2015), pp.191–212; Christoph
Vogel, ‘Contested statehood, security dilemmas, and militia politics: The rise and transform-
ation of Raia Mutomboki in eastern DRC’, in Marijke Verpoorten, Stef Vandeginste, and
Filip Reyntjens (eds), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2013–2014 (L’Harmattan, Paris,
2014), pp. 307–333.
45. Kasper Hoffmann, ‘Myths set in motion: The moral economy of Maï-Maï governance’,
in Arjona et al., Rebel governance, pp.158–179; Vogel, ‘Contested statehood’.
46. Judith Verweijen, ‘Stable instability: Political settlements and armed groups in the
Congo’ (Rift Valley Institute, London, 2016), pp. 59–61.
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items, arrange logistics, and provide social and medical care. Additionally,
they assist with recruiting fighters, gathering intelligence, and maintaining
social control, for instance by intimidating civilian detractors.47 The Mai-
Mai commonly also rely on civilian collaborators, often urban-based polit-
ical supporters, for political mobilization and communication. These sup-
porters have a wide range of jobs, working for NGOs or the UN, as
entrepreneurs or as state agents.48
Indeed, Mai-Mai sympathizers within the state apparatus – found
among local, provincial, and national-level politicians and officials – are
numerous. They provide various forms of active and passive assistance,
including financial support and political cover.49 Mai-Mai supporters can
also be found in the FARDC, including among circles of ex-Mai-Mai offi-
cers who feel marginalized.50 Such wide-ranging collaboration helps the
Mai-Mai to diffuse discourses that shape people’s techniques of the self,
even in zones where they are not physically present. In the following, we
further explore these techniques of government alongside more direct and
coercive techniques of power. For analytical purposes, we have regrouped
these different techniques into four broad, partly overlapping clusters.
Ethnic and customary techniques
Within the Kivu provinces, the deeply entangled notions of territory, eth-
nic identity, and customary authority are constitutive of political subjectiv-
ities.51 This nexus was forged through colonial native policy, which
formed and institutionalized territorially fixed chefferies (chiefdoms). The
latter regrouped ‘native populations’ ostensibly belonging to the same
‘ethnic type’, and made them the subjects of customary chiefs. This bio-
political technology of government sought to govern natives at a distance
through a set of partly invented customs.52 The resulting regime of truth
fostered the formation of ethno-territorial forms of ‘citizenship’ that con-
fer rights and duties on subjects of customary chiefs, such as access to
communal land and paying customary taxes.53
47. Ibid, pp. 46–50.
48. Verweijen, ‘From autochthony to violence’.
49. UN, Final report of the group of experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2011/
738 (United Nations Security Council, New York, NY), pp. 55–56.
50. Judith Verweijen, The ambiguity of militarization: The complex interaction between the
Congolese armed forces and civilians in the Kivu provinces, eastern DR Congo (Utrecht
University, unpublished PhD dissertation, 2015), p. 267.
51. Verweijen and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed mobilisation’.
52. Kasper Hoffmann, Ethnogovernmentality: The making of ethnic territories and subjects in
eastern Congo (Roskilde University, unpublished PhD dissertation, 2014), pp. 142–143.
53. Bosco Muchukiwa, Territoires ethniques et territoires étatiques: Pouvoirs locaux et conflits
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These ethno-territorial ‘truths’ provided fertile soil for the cultivation of
autochthony discourses, which classify groups with ‘tribal homelands’ as
‘autochthones’, and those without as ‘foreigners’. This last status is often
attributed to Rwandophones, or speakers of Kinyarwanda language (also
spoken in Rwanda). During the Congo Wars, when Rwanda-led rebel
groups occupied large swathes of the Kivus, autochthony discourses
thrived.54 These discourses also formed important mobilizing narratives
for Mai-Mai groups, which portrayed themselves as the defenders of the
customs, culture, land, and rights of ‘autochthonous communities’.
Rwandophones, by contrast, were accused of ‘invading’ and ‘occupying’
the autochthones’ ancestral lands with the intent to dominate or even
exterminate them.55 The claim that ‘foreigners’ constitute an existential
threat exemplifies a particularly dangerous aspect of biopolitics, namely,
the idea that caring for the population of ‘ethnic selves’ entails the elimin-
ation or expulsion of ‘ethnic others’.56
Ideas of autochthony and foreign threat still resonate in the Kivus
today. The reasons for this are fourfold. First, these notions evoke particu-
lar ethno-territorial subjectivities that continue to be salient, in part due to
the Congolese state’s continued reliance on customary authority to govern
rural areas. Second, discourses of autochthony tap into memories of mas-
sacres and other violence that many people ascribe primarily to Rwanda-
backed rebel groups.57 Third, these discourses resonate with long-
established geopolitical narratives on imperialism and the annexationist
tendencies of neighbouring countries, which continue to have purchase.58
Fourth, the autochthon/foreigner dichotomy provides an interpretative
grid through which people ‘make sense’ of the often confusing political-
military developments that they face in their everyday lives.59 The Mai-
Mai actively draw upon this grid by framing significant events in the lan-
guage of autochthony, generally by linking them to ‘foreign invasion’.
A clear example of such framing is the Mai-Mai Yakotumba’s portrayal
of the presence of a transnational gold exploration company in their fief as
a form of ‘foreign invasion’ of the Babembe’s ancestral grounds. By dif-
fusing this narrative during public meetings, where they called upon the
population to resist the mining company, they contributed to significant
54. Stephen Jackson, ‘Sons of which soil? The language and politics of autochthony in east-
ern D.R. Congo’, African Studies Review 49, 2 (2006), pp. 95–123.
55. Hoffmann, ‘Myths set in motion’; Jackson, ‘Sons of which soil?’
56. Foucault, History of sexuality, p. 137.
57. Verweijen, ‘From autochthony to violence?’
58. Jackson, ‘Sons of which soil?’; Gillian Mathys, ‘Bringing history back in: Past, present
and conflict in Rwanda and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’, The Journal of
African History 58, 3 (2017), pp. 465–487.
59. Verweijen, ‘From autochthony to violence?’
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protest activism.60 Similarly, by associating Rwandophone cattle owners
with ‘foreigners’, Mai-Mai ideologues are able to frame transhumance
(the seasonal migration of cattle during which they often trample on farm-
ers’ fields) as a ‘foreign invasion’ of autochthones’ ancestral lands. This
narrative complicates the resolution of transhumance-related conflicts,
and fosters sympathy for cattle-looting by the Mai-Mai.61 In addition to
drawing on existing discourses of autochthony, the Mai-Mai also alter
them, propagating more radical views on ‘foreign threat’ than many other
Congolese. For instance, while moderates often acknowledge that certain
Rwandophone groups arrived in precolonial times, many Mai-Mai con-
sider all Rwandophones recent ‘immigrants’ and ‘refugees’.62
Aside from employing autochthony discourses, another technique of
Mai-Mai rule that draws on the nexus between territory, ethnicity, and
customary authority is collaborating with bami (customary chiefs, singular:
mwami). While chiefly authority has eroded in many parts of the Kivus,
bami continue to be recognized as governors of particular ethnic commu-
nities and custodians of their ancestral lands. Moreover, they are con-
sidered the embodiment and guardians of communal identity, customs,
and security, which invests them with considerable social and moral sta-
tus.63 As a nurse from Bulambika in Kalehe put it:
As inhabitants of a village, we acknowledge customary power. Why? Because we have
received land from our bami. The politico-administrative system cannot give us land in
the same way. Thus, in a way the customary chief is the person who has granted us our
plots where we live and where we cultivate. And we owe him respect. Apart from that, he
is also someone who defends the traditional values of his people.64
The Mai-Mai also profess to respect customary authority. As Mai-Mai
leader Amuri Yakotumba phrased it: ‘In our culture, the supreme com-
manders are customary chiefs.’65 Similar to the forms of indirect rule
adopted by the colonial and postcolonial state, the Mai-Mai’s support of
chiefs is inscribed in biopolitical rationalities of government, in particular
assuring the well-being and productivity of populations.66 By working
with chiefs, for instance demanding that they collect taxes, Mai-Mai
groups show that they respect local values of authority. Moreover, they
60. Judith Verweijen, ‘Luddites in the Congo? Analyzing violent responses to the expansion
of industrial mining amidst militarization’, City 21, 3–4 (2017), pp. 466–482.
61. Judith Verweijen and Justine Brabant, ‘Cows and guns: Cattle-related conflict and
armed violence in South Kivu, DR Congo’, Journal of Modern African Studies 55, 1 (2017),
pp. 1–27.
62. Verweijen and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed mobilisation’, pp. 16–17.
63. Paul Romain Namegabe, ‘Le pouvoir traditionnel au Sud-Kivu de 1998–2003: Rôle et
perspectives’, in Filip Reyntjens and Stefaan Marysse (eds), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs:
Annuaire 2004–2005 (L’Harmattan, Paris, 2005), pp. 209–234.
64. Interview, nurse, Bulambika, 25 September 2011.
65. Interview, Amuri Yakotumba, Sebele, 15 December 2011.
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evoke in this way a deeply entrenched subjectivity, namely, being subject
to (ethno-territorially defined) customary authority. A former member of
the Mai-Mai group of General Padiri, the largest coalition of Mai-Mai
forces operating in South Kivu during the Second Congo War, explained:
Wherever the movement made headway, we approached the bami.… The mwami plays a
major role because he has the authority: if he himself opposes us, then everybody is going
to refuse to collaborate because the people pay heed to the word of the mwami … Every
time Padiri organized ceremonies, he invited the bami and emphasized their power
because it was they who mobilized the population to supply the soldiers with provisions
and to integrate the youths into the movement.67
To conclude, entwined techniques of power relating to autochthony, eth-
nic territoriality, and customary authority are constitutive of Mai-Mai
rule. Territory is therefore significant, but not only as an object to be dir-
ectly controlled, as conceived in much of the rebel governance litera-
ture.68 Rather, territory also figures as a ‘political technology’ in the form
of ideas of ancestral lands and ‘ethnic homelands’ that appeal to people’s
subjectivities.69 By evoking notions of ethnicized territory and citizenship,
Mai-Mai groups mobilize civilian support for defending ancestral lands
and the state’s territory against the ‘foreign enemy’. This ethno-territorial
technique of government is symbolically efficacious, because it draws on
existing discourses and techniques of ordering space.
Spiritual techniques
In tracing the historical evolution of governmentality, Foucault located its
roots in the Christian pastorate. He thus showed that spiritual beliefs and
techniques of power blended with secular ‘modern’ forms of power in the
constitution of governmentalities.70 Spiritual notions – derived from a
mixture of ever-evolving Judeo-Christian and other beliefs – are also con-
stitutive of Mai-Mai rule. Mai-Mai beliefs reflect a cosmological world-
view that emphasizes spiritual interdependence, order, and harmony.71 As
in Christianity, the figure of God is central to this worldview, but Mai-
Mai groups may insist on their specifically African way of worshipping the
Supreme Being. A former member of Padiri’s group put it as follows:
We as Africans we have our own way of believing, adoring, praying; we believe in the
ancestors; we believe in the truth of dreams. The Mai-Mai movement is not really a
Christian movement but rather a non-clerical spiritual movement with purely African
67. Interview, ex-territorial administrator of Mai-Mai Padiri, Bukavu, 21 March 2005.
68. Kasfir, ‘Rebel governance’, p. 12; Mampilly, Rebel rulers, pp. 3–4.
69. Stuart Elden, The birth of territory (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 2013), pp.
16–17; for a discussion of the myth of autochthony as political technology, see pp. 25–26.
70. Foucault, Security, territory, population, pp. 198–199, p. 239.
71. Hoffmann, ‘Myths set in motion’.
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beliefs, which is wider than European spiritual culture. However, we do believe in God,
because there is only one God.72
The centrality of the figure of God also shines through in Mai-Mai
groups’ tendency to frame the liberation of the Congolese nation from for-
eign domination in eschatological terms, as a divine mission to carry out
the will of God. This linking of autochthony, war, and the divine is spe-
cific to the Mai-Mai’s cosmological worldview. It shows that the Mai-Mai
not only draw upon existing discourses and beliefs, but also reconfigure
and reinterpret them.73
The Mai-Mai’s cosmological worldview inspires a wide range of prac-
tices, often enacted by docteurs (spiritual specialists) or aumôniers (army
chaplains). These spiritual leaders provide guidance to soldiers, and
sometimes also to civilians. For instance, the Mai-Mai Yakotumba nomi-
nated a pasteur (vicar) as so-called ‘S5’, which is a general staff function
charged with civil–military relations.74 Docteurs and pasteurs carry out vari-
ous spiritual techniques, like prayers and rituals, both among themselves
and among civilians. Rituals are often practised during initiation as part of
the protective system of dawa (medicine). This system consists of a set of
techniques of purification that are believed to empower and protect initi-
ates from harm, provided an ethical regimen is adhered to. Although this
regimen differs per group and per dawa, it commonly includes the follow-
ing techniques of the self: sexual abstinence, not consuming certain food-
stuffs like leaves, restrictions on washing body parts, not stealing from
civilians, and sometimes simply respecting the Ten Commandments.75
The symbolic efficacy of this regimen is partly predicated on the belief
that disregarding the ‘conditions’ of the dawa will result in fatal
misfortune.
Despite occasionally exchanging ideas, formulas, and techniques, Mai-
Mai groups generally keep the origins and workings of their dawa secret.
In this way, they show that they have access to sacred, secret, and salutary
spiritual knowledge and powers, which allows them to appear as miracle
makers.76 In the course of the insurgency that toppled Mobutu in 1997,
the mere belief in these spiritual powers, including the Mai-Mai’s ability
72. Interview, ex-Mai-Mai officer, Kisangani, 30 April 2005. Note that other groups, like
Yakotumba’s, do profile themselves explicitly as ‘Christian’.
73. See also Fraternel Divin Amuri Misako, La symbolique de la légitimation de la violence
milicienne en Afrique: Continuités et réinventions du messianisme nationaliste chez les maï maï du
Maniema au Congo-Kinshasa (Éditions universitaires européennes, Saarbrücken, 2012).
74. Interviews, Mai-Mai members, Ubwari, 24 and 25 February 2011.
75. Hoffmann, ‘Myths set in motion’; Interviews, Mai-Mai Kapopo members, Lubumba,
20 November 2011.
76. Emma Wild-Wood, ‘“Is it witchcraft? Is it Satan? It is a miracle?” Mai-Mai soldiers
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to become invisible or invulnerable to bullets, often caused the govern-
ment forces to flee in panic.77 Today, some army soldiers still fear fighting
the Mai-Mai for the same reason.78 Belief in the Mai-Mai’s spiritual
powers is also widespread among civilians. Moreover, the reputed spirit-
ual potency of the Mai-Mai constitutes a source of attraction to these
groups, in particular in situations of upheaval and insecurity. For instance,
in Kalehe in 2011, a Mai-Mai group named Rayia Mutomboki began a
campaign against a Rwandan rebel movement that was perceived as very
powerful. Rumours spread that the Rayia possessed a new powerful dawa
formula made by Barega docteurs originating from Shabunda territory.
Beliefs in the power of this dawa, and thereby in the Rayia’s capacity to
protect the community against the threat posed by the Rwandan rebels,
helped mobilize massive civilian support for this group.79
However, civilians also fear the Mai-Mai’s spiritual power, believing it
can be used to harm them if they disobey. As a civil society activist
explained: ‘When you refuse [Mai-Mai demands] something bad might
happen to you one day. We cannot always know how … you know, the
Mai-Mai have their fêticheurs (spiritual specialists)’.80 And in certain vil-
lages in the Ruzizi Plain people told us that through the use of dawa, the
Mai-Mai are able to identify witches.81 These beliefs are further rein-
forced by the involvement of some Mai-Mai groups, like Simusizi’s, in the
targeted killing of suspected witches.82 Such killings are partly perceived
as a way to purify or cleanse the social body from harmful and polluting
elements in order to restore harmony and order – constituting, in effect, a
biopolitical technique of community ‘security’.83 Hence, while the spirit-
ual power/knowledge techniques employed by the Mai-Mai to a large
extent work by speaking to the ways in which people in the Kivus are
‘made up’ as spiritual subjects, they also involve threats, repression, and
violence.
Techniques of ‘stateness’
Another important cluster of techniques of Mai-Mai rule is their enact-
ment of ‘languages of stateness’. Coined by Thomas Hansen and Finn
77. Ibid, pp. 453–454.
78. Interviews with FARDC officers, inter alia, Lulimba, 29 February 2011 and Mukera,
16 February 2011.
79. Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed groups’.
80. Interview, civil society activist, Mukera, 19 February 2012.
81. For example, interviews, residents, Nyakabere II and Bwegera, 19 February 2017.
82. Similar beliefs surround unarmed vigilante groups that use dawa, see Judith Verweijen,
‘The disconcerting popularity of popular in/justice in Fizi/Uvira, eastern DR Congo’,
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 22, 3 (2015), pp. 335–359.
83. Ibid; cf. Tim Allen and Kyla Reid, ‘Justice at the margins: Witches, poisoners, and
social accountability in Northern Uganda’, Medical Anthropology 34, 2 (2014), pp. 106–123.
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Stepputat, this term refers to the symbols, discourses, and practices asso-
ciated with the state as a sovereign and territorially bounded entity, which
were dispersed across the globe by colonization.84 Despite widespread dis-
content with state authorities, languages of stateness remain firmly
implanted in Congolese citizens’ understandings of political order.
Stateness evokes a particular discourse of power, which is associated with
officiality, bureaucracy, sovereignty, bounded territory, the law, and what
it means to be Congolese in terms of citizens’ rights and obligations vis-à-
vis the state and the nation.85 For instance, when asked to list the tasks of
the military – an institution strongly associated with stateness – citizens in
the Kivus highlight the following aspects: ‘protecting citizens/civilians and
their goods’ (Swahili: ku chunga (ba)raia na mali yao/yake), and ‘defend-
ing territorial integrity’ (Swahili: ku kinga mipaka ya inchi). Hence, in rela-
tion to the military, stateness is associated with territorial sovereignty and
with the provision of public goods, namely, security.86
Mai-Mai groups draw upon similar interpretations of discourses of
stateness as Congolese citizens. A clear example is the fact that their mili-
tary organization tends to mimic that of the Congolese army. They have a
similar rank system (general, colonel, major, etc.), unit organization (bri-
gade, battalion, company, etc.), and command structures, consisting of
an état-major (general staff) composed of five bureaux (departments)
linked to different staff functions (like personnel, intelligence, operations).
These organizational structures, however, may be adapted to Mai-Mai
groups’ own situations and needs. For instance, while the Mai-Mai Aoci
suppressed bureau 1 (personnel affairs), since the group had ‘no salaries to
pay to their troops’,87 Padiri’s group added a bureau 6, which was respon-
sible for administering dawa.88
Being jeshi (soldier/army) is also a technique of the self for Mai-Mai
combatants. As a soldier from the Mai-Mai Mushombe said: ‘Our work is
the same [as the national army]. It is to protect citizens and their goods
and to defend territorial integrity.’89 This formulation is identical to how
both civilians and government soldiers describe the FARDC’s mandate
84. Thomas B. Hansen and Finn Stepputat (eds), States of imagination: Ethnographic
explorations of the postcolonial state (Duke University Press, Durham, NC and London, 2001),
pp. 5–7.
85. Theodore Trefon, ‘Public service provision in a failed state: Looking beyond predation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Review of African Political Economy 36, 119 (2009),
pp. 9–21; Pierre Englebert, Why Congo persists: Sovereignty, globalization and the violent repro-
duction of a weak state, Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper 95 (University of Oxford,
Oxford, 2003).
86. Verweijen, Ambiguity of militarization, p. 111.
87. Mai-Mai Aoci, untitled (unpublished manuscript, accessed in Minembwe in December
2010), n.p.
88. Hoffmann, ‘Myths set in motion’, p. 166.
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and role.90 The mimicry of certain body movements (e.g. goose stepping)
and the wearing of uniforms that resemble those of the FARDC further
embolden Mai-Mai combatants’ sense of being jeshi. At the same time,
these features show to civilians that they are ‘real soldiers’ and not rag-tag
bands of brigands. Hence, wearing an army uniform is a technique of
power that evokes languages of stateness. By the same token, Mai-Mai
groups create stamps that resemble those of state authorities, using them
both for internal administration and for external communication. Since a
document without a stamp is commonly believed to be invalid in the
Congo, using a stamp is a technique of truth-making which authorizes
Mai-Mai rule through ‘officialization’.91
The Mai-Mai also enact long-standing micro-practices of stateness
related to extracting resources from civilians, often by mimicking govern-
ment agencies. A striking example is a form of taxation imposed on shops
and local organizations named effort de guerre (war effort). The colonial
authorities introduced this tax during the Second World War, when rural
populations had to provide a prescribed quota of agricultural products
like rice, cotton, and rubber.92 During the Congo Wars, various rebel
movements similarly used the term effort de guerre to justify the extraction
of resources from civilians. The term has continued to be employed by
both state and rebel forces since, with the aim of transforming contribu-
tions into a civic duty.93 For their part, the Mai-Mai justify the effort de
guerre as necessary for the defence of both the (autochthon) population/
nation and the Congo’s territorial integrity against the continued threat of
‘foreign invasion’.
Civilians are also called upon as state subjects when Mai-Mai groups
criticize the Congolese government for maintaining a state that is not
‘state-like’ enough, as it cannot ensure basic state functions. Congolese
state institutions are notoriously incapable of living up to citizens’ expec-
tations to protect and care for them, being primarily known for their
extractive and abusive practices.94 As a young man commented: ‘In the
Congo, the population is the field of the state, and all they do is harvest.’95
Echoing these popular sentiments, Mai-Mai groups accuse state officials
of having abandoned their duties vis-à-vis the population. For instance, in
the preamble to its ‘project of society’, the political wing of the Mai-Mai
90. Verweijen, Ambiguity of militarization, pp. 111, 120–121.
91. Cf. Trefon, ‘Public service provision’, p. 12.
92. Osumaka Likaka, Rural society and cotton in colonial Zaire (University of Wisconsin
Press, Madison, WI, 1997), pp. 40–41, 98.
93. Verweijen, Ambiguity of militarization, p. 136; Koen Vlassenroot, Éméry Mudinga, and
Kasper Hoffmann, ‘Contesting authority: Armed rebellion and military fragmentation in
Walikale and Kalehe, North and South Kivu’ (Rift Valley Institute, London, 2016), p. 69.
94. Trefon, ‘Public service provision’.
95. Interview, hotel receptionist, Butembo, 28 April 2010.
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Yakotumba tells us that ‘the state has stopped being the guarantor of pub-
lic security, justice, peace in all its aspects and respect for its internal and
external engagements’.96 The Mai-Mai claim to fill the resulting void, and
thus paradoxically pose as the guarantors of the state-based order. For
instance, the Mai-Mai Kapopo, who used to be based in the isolated
Itombwe forest, professed to partly replace the state by maintaining order
and providing security in an area devoid of state security forces or any
other state agents.97
Articulating criticism against the state taps into widespread feelings of
disillusionment with the current government. While many Congolese
denounce the Mai-Mai for behaving as disgracefully as state agents, to
some they also symbolize resistance to the current regime and a refusal to
accept the status quo.98 Indeed, Mai-Mai groups appeal to Congolese citi-
zens’ sense of duty vis-à-vis the nation by asking them to hold the govern-
ment to account, for instance during elections. To give an example, during
the 2011 presidential elections, the Mai-Mai Yakotumba called upon the
population of Fizi to vote for an opposition candidate (Etienne Tshisekedi)
and not for the incumbent, Joseph Kabila. While not the only factor, these
appeals contributed to Tshisekedi’s 75.15 percent of the vote in Fizi, versus
13.62 for Kabila.99 Similar notions of rebellious citizenship are evoked by
the Mai-Mai groups that call themselves Rayia Mutomboki. This name
reflects an emphasis on the notion of citizen (rayia) and, by invoking anger
(mutomboki), their opposition to the current political order.100
In sum, Mai-Mai groups enact numerous practices of stateness, includ-
ing attempts to build territorialized state-like institutions. However, in
contrast to the rebel governance literature, we do not see such attempts as
universal or necessary features of rebel rule. Rather, we interpret them as
looping effects of existing, historically contingent languages of stateness,
or more succinctly, as looping effects of the ‘state effect’, or the percep-
tion that the state exists as an intrinsic object separate from and above
society.101
Techniques of patronage and protection
Like those of Congolese state agents, the Mai-Mai’s techniques of state-
ness merge, complement, and alternate with techniques of patronage and
96. PARC, Projet de la société (project of society), unpublished document, 2007, p. 2.
97. Interview Kapopo Alunda, Bukavu, 27 March 2011.
98. Verweijen, ‘Stable instability’, pp. 59–61.
99. Verweijen, ‘From autochthony to violence?’ p. 171.
100. Vogel, ‘Contested statehood’, p. 307.
101. Timothy Mitchell, ‘Society, economy, and the state effect’, in Sharma Aradhana and
Akhil Gupta (eds), The anthropology of the state: A reader (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford,
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protection. Patron–client ties revolve around the exchange of loyalty for
(access to) material and symbolic resources and certain forms of protec-
tion against political, physical, and socio-economic insecurity.102 These
ties give rise to asymmetric power relations that are described and per-
ceived in familial and paternal metaphors, constituting a moral grid that is
woven into rationalities of government.103 Within this moral grid, the
father/patron is expected to provide for the well-being and security of his
dependants/clients, as symbolized in his ability to ‘give’. However, fatherly
authority also expresses an unequal status, as the stern father is authorized
to take decisions and to punish and control his ‘children’. The latter
assume client subjectivity, implying that they see themselves as belonging
and being subordinate to the patron, who represents collective well-being
and pride.104 There is a clear parallel between such forms of patronage
and what Foucault calls ‘pastoral power’. Within pastoral power relations,
it is the duty of the pastor to care for the collective of the flock – the ante-
cedent of the modern biopolitical notion of the population – but, at the
same time, in an individualizing and controlling manner, for each member
of the flock. Pastoral power, therefore, is simultaneously caring, control-
ling, and coercive.105
The prominence of techniques of patronage among Mai-Mai groups is
reflected in Mai-Mai commanders’ tendency to identify with the role of
father of the family. An ex-Mai-Mai female officer said: ‘As a commander
I considered myself like a father, because I had to nourish and protect my
guard’.106 Civilians also speak about Mai-Mai leaders in fatherly or pas-
toral metaphors, in particular when they are from the (ethnic) community
the Mai-Mai claim to defend. At the start of his career as a Mai-Mai
leader, Yakotumba used to be called commandant-pasteur (pastor-com-
mander) due to his correct behaviour and care for civilians.107 This ‘famil-
iarization’ of power relations is further promoted by the fact that many
combatants originate from the villages where they operate. As such, they
are commonly referred to as batoto ya mungini (children from the
village).108
102. Marshall D. Sahlins, ‘Poor man, rich man, big-man, chief: Political types in
Melanesia and Polynesia’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 5, 3 (1963), pp.
285–303; Bayart, L’État en Afrique, pp. 280–288.
103. Michael Schatzberg, The dialectics of oppression in Zaire (Indiana University Press,
Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1988), pp. 71–98.
104. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz. Africa works: Disorder as political instrument
(James Currey, Oxford, and Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN
1999), pp. 37–39; 53–55.
105. Foucault, Security, territory, population, pp. 169–174, pp. 235–239.
106. Interview, ex-Mai-Mai officer, Kisangani, 1 May 2005.
107. Interviews, civil society members, Baraka, 12 December 2011 and Fizi centre, 11
December 2011.
108. Interview, inhabitants, Lubondja, 29 December 2011.
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Intimate relations increase civilians’ trust in Mai-Mai officers.
Consequently, depending on local power configurations, they often solicit
protection from them, rather than from the state security forces.109 Such
protection generally revolves around ensuring political, physical, and
socio-economic security. For example, Mai-Mai officers may safeguard
clients’ property by escorting their convoys, or protect illegal business
activities by persuading or pressurizing state agents not to interfere. Mai-
Mai patrons also frequently support clients involved in disputes, intimi-
dating or even punishing the opposing camp.110 However, reflecting the
blurred boundary between rebel and state rule, in order to provide protec-
tion, Mai-Mai leaders themselves also need patronage, in particular from
high-ranking politicians and officials. Such high-level protectors, com-
monly called parapluies (umbrellas), can apply pressure on local political
actors to foster their clients’ interests – a widespread technique of patron-
age/protection known as traffic d’influence (influence peddling). A Mai-
Mai leader reported to frequently employ this technique – in conjunction
with direct intimidation like sending threatening text messages by phone –
was Bede Rusagara, who used to operate in the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira terri-
tory. By mobilizing his parapluies in Bukavu and Kinshasa, Bede was able
to shape decision-making processes in the local administration. In this
way, he helped his clients obtain plots of land and jobs, or exoneration
from judicial persecution.111
The example of Bede shows that while techniques of patronage/protec-
tion work in part through ‘regulated freedom’– in particular by making
people cognizant of their status as clients who are indebted to their
patrons – they also involve forms of direct coercion. This applies particu-
larly where protection services (like shielding illegal practices or settling
private scores) are provided against the payment of protection fees.112
While protection in exchange for direct payment is sometimes solicited on
a voluntary basis, it is often imposed, if necessary through violence. In
such cases, ‘protection’ becomes less a pastoral technique of government,
and more an instance of direct coercion. For instance, in the Ruzizi Plain,
cattle owners pay protection fees to the Fuliiru Mai-Mai groups of
Simusizi and Karakara in order to prevent their cattle from being looted
by these groups. Similarly, mini-bus operators crossing the Plain donate
109. Carla Suarez, ‘“Living between two lions”: Civilian protection strategies during
armed violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’, Journal of Peacebuilding
and Development 12, 3 (2017), pp. 54–67.
110. Hoffmann and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed groups’, p. 217.
111. Judith Verweijen, ‘A microcosm of militarization: Conflict, governance and armed
mobilization in Uvira’ (Rift Valley Institute, London, 2016), pp. 28–29.
112. See also Timothy Raeymaekers, Violent capitalism and hybrid identity in the eastern
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to the Mai-Mai to avoid being ambushed. At the same time, these Fuliiru
Mai-Mai groups try to legitimize the imposed contributions by pointing to
their role as protectors of the Fuliiru community and its customary right
to rule the Ruzizi Plain in the face of threats from ‘foreigners’.113 This
intertwining of techniques of patronage/protection with ethnic and cus-
tomary techniques of government illustrates how within Mai-Mai rule,
direct and indirect, coercive and less coercive techniques of power interact
and mutually reinforce each other.
Conclusion
Existing literature on rebel governance situates power mostly in rebel
rulers themselves, and in the territorialized political institutions and net-
works of which they form part.114 This literature tends to reflect a sub-
stantive and instrumental view of power, implying it is seen as something
that is held and wielded by rulers, in this case rebels, over subjects. From
this perspective, Mai-Mai groups in the eastern Congo could hardly be
said to govern. They rarely control territory durably or create elaborate
and stable political institutions to rule civilians. Similarly, focusing on the
networks in which the Mai-Mai are embedded or their negotiations with
other political actors, which is common in the literature on governance in
violent orders,115 would have missed many of the ways in which Mai-Mai
groups shape civilians’ fields of possible action.
From the perspective of governmentality, by contrast, the Mai-Mai
could be said to govern civilians. By focusing on micro-practices, dis-
courses, and rationalities of power, rather than on institutions, actors, or
networks, a governmentality perspective has allowed us to uncover a
much wider array of techniques through which the Mai-Mai rule civilians.
In particular, it has drawn attention to how rebel rule may shape people’s
subjectivities and self-conduct. We have identified four salient clusters of
techniques of Mai-Mai rule, relating to ethnicity and custom, spirituality,
stateness, and patronage and protection, respectively. These techniques
draw upon and evoke existing regimes of truth and practices of power,
which they creatively adapt, recast, and combine. Following Nikolas
Rose, we therefore suggest that Mai-Mai rule is ‘assembled’ from a variety
of regimes of truth and techniques of power.116 In this manner, Mai-Mai
113. Verweijen, ‘Microcosm’, pp. 31–33.
114. E.g. Kasfir, ‘Rebel governance’; Arjona, ‘Wartime institutions’; Weinstein, Inside
rebellion; Mampilly, Rebel rulers.
115. E.g. Raeymaekers et al. ‘State and non-state governance’; Reno, Warlord politics.
116. Nikolas Rose, Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1999), pp. 17–18.
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rule both shapes and is shaped by the socio-political order in which these
groups are situated.
Based on our analysis of Mai-Mai groups, we contend that the analytic
of power offered by governmentality, specifically the relational under-
standing of power, the focus on micro-practices, and the acknowledgment
of a plurality of rationalities of power, can help transcend some of the lim-
its of conventional thinking on political order in zones of violent con-
flict.117 In particular, this analytic overcomes thinking in binaries,
including public versus private; rebel versus state; and secular versus reli-
gious. Certainly, as discussed above, the literature on networked and
negotiated governance in violent orders has already moved beyond these
dichotomies. However, a governmentality perspective goes even further in
this direction by focusing primarily on actual practices and rationalities of
power. Moreover, this perspective allows for a more nuanced understand-
ing of the role of and interplay between coercion and freedom. As we
have seen, many of the Mai-Mai’s techniques of power rely on ‘regulated
freedom’, or making people cognizant of their moral and citizenly duties,
for instance towards their ethnic communities, God, their chiefs, their
patrons, or their families. Although the importance of morality and com-
munity is acknowledged by that part of the rebel governance literature
examining societal norms, beliefs, and values, this literature ultimately
focuses on how these elements shape rebels’ legitimacy – seen as an attri-
bute or property of rebel rulers – rather than subjects’ techniques of the
self.118 A governmentality perspective instead analyses how norms, beliefs,
and values shape modes of knowing, being, and conducting the self, con-
sidering these modes in turn to be constitutive of emergent rationalities
and techniques of power. From a governmentality perspective, then, rebel
governance refers not so much to a set of specific social and political insti-
tutions as to a cluster of techniques of power that draw upon and trans-
form existing regimes of truth and practices and rationalities of power that
are (re)produced throughout the social body as a whole.
By showing the pertinence of a governmentality perspective for the
study of Mai-Mai rule in the eastern Congo, this article contributes to a
growing body of governmentality studies focusing on Africa.119 Much of
this literature examines international interventions and their effects in situ,
including how they foster new subjectivities and techniques of
117. See Death, ‘Governmentality at the limits of the international’.
118. See Duyvesteyn, ‘Rebels and legitimacy’, pp. 672–674.
119. For example, Jan Bachmann, ‘Governmentality and counterterrorism: Appropriating
international security projects in Kenya’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6, 1 (2012),
pp. 41–56; Jana Hönke, Transnational companies and security governance: Hybrid practices in a
postcolonial world (Routledge, New York, NY, and London, 2013); Vinh-Kim Nguyen,
‘Government-by-exception: Enrolment and experimentality in mass HIV treatment pro-
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government.120 In this article, by contrast, we have focused on forms of
governmentality that are not directly related to international interventions.
As such, we demonstrate that current forms of governmentality in non-
Western settings do not necessarily spring from the techniques of govern-
ment of certified Western ‘experts’ and resourceful organizations. The
knowledge, rationalities, and techniques of power shaping governmental-
ities in these settings cannot be traced to clearly identifiable ‘centres’.
Rather, they spread contingently throughout societies in successive waves
of looping effects that produce historically contingent forms of govern-
mentality. It is the study of the workings and effects of these forms of
knowledge, rationalities, and techniques of power – regardless of their ori-
gins – that allows the analyst to develop a fine-grained understanding of
how power operates in a given social order, including in zones of violent
conflict and in respect of rebel rule.
120. Not all studies of governmentality in Africa focus primarily on external interventions,
see, for example, Achille Mbembe, On the postcolony (University of California Press, Berkeley
and Los Angeles, CA, 2001); Roitman, Fiscal disobedience.








niversity user on 26 Septem
ber 2018
